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THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE
AND THE DUTY TO SETTLE
Leo P. Martinez*
Abstract
More than sixty years ago, Judge Robert Keeton authored what has
come to be the definitive exegesis on the insurer’s duty to settle. 1 Judge
Keeton was followed some twenty-five years later by Professor Kent
Syverud with what has come to be the second definitive work on the
insurer’s duty to settle.2 Since that time, a scattering of articles have
addressed the duty to settle but none have done so in Syverud’s
comprehensive way. The occasion of the American Law Institute’s (“ALI”)
project, the Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance, initiated five
years ago, provides the opportunity to revisit the insurer’s “duty to settle.”
* Albert Abramson Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law. I am grateful to the Rutgers Center for Risk and Responsibility for hosting their fine
Conference on the Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance at which an early version
of this Article was presented on February 27, 2015.
Special thanks to my friends: David Goodwin who is a partner in the San Francisco
office of Covington & Burling for his patience with me regarding my understanding of
insurance law; Douglas C. Richmond, Senior Vice President AON Risk Services, Inc., whose
sense for nuances influences much of my work; my colleague Professor David Levine, for his
remedies expertise; and Margie Lariviere who is a partner in the San Francisco Office of
Gordon & Rees for contributing her wisdom. I gratefully acknowledge the diligent and able
research assistance of Emalie Diaz Sundale, Hastings class of 2016. Errors are mine alone.
1. Robert E. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV. L.
REV. 1136 (1954).
2. Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113 (1990); see Charles Silver,
A Missed Misalignment of Interests: A Comment on Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 77 VA. L.
REV. 1585, 1585 (1991) (“A single publication rarely makes an entire body of literature
obsolete, but Professor Kent D. Syverud’s article on the duty to settle arguably ha[d] that
effect.” (footnote omitted)); Chris Wood, Note, Assignments of Rights and Covenants Not to
Execute in Insurance Litigation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1373, 1409 n.192 (1997) (describing the
Syverud article as a seminal piece). While I refer to Professor Syverud in this Article, he is
now the president of Syracuse University after having completed successful stints as the
dean of the law schools at Vanderbilt University and Washington University in St. Louis.
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The ALI’s aim for the Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance is
to “cover[] the law of contracts in the liability insurance context, liability
insurance coverage, and the management of insured liabilities.”3 Using
Professor Syverud’s piece as a baseline and Judge Keeton’s piece as
background, this Article focuses on the project’s substantive changes to the
existing rules regarding an insurer’s “duty to settle.”
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INTRODUCTION
The “duty to settle” refers to the insurer’s obligation to settle claims
against its insured within the applicable policy limits when proceeding to
trial could result in a judgment in excess of the policy limits.4 This simple
3. Projects: Restatement of the Law, Liability Insurance, A.L.I., https://www.ali.org/
projects/show/liability-insurance/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2015).
4. The Discussion Draft provides: “An insurer that breaches the duty to make
reasonable settlement decisions is subject to liability for the full amount of damages
assessed against the insured in the underlying suit, without regard to the policy limits.”
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 27(1) (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015); see
Syverud, supra note 2, at 1117–26. The Discussion Draft talks in terms of the insurer’s duty
to make reasonable settlement decisions. While this is a more aptly descriptive title, I
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explanation belies the complexity of the body of law surrounding the duty
and does not capture the permutations that may affect the duty’s scope
and the consequences of its breach.
In 2010, the ALI initiated a project, the Principles of the Law of
Liability Insurance. With the Principles project, the ALI expected to
publish extensive recommendations for changes to areas of insurance law
that were thought to need reform.5
On October 20, 2014, the ALI announced that its Council had made
the project a Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance. 6 In
particular, the ALI’s aim was to “cover[] the law of contracts in the
liability insurance context, liability insurance coverage, and management
of insured liabilities.”7
This Article focuses on one aspect of the Restatement of the Law of
Liability Insurance—the insurer’s duty to settle and the possible effects
on state substantive law that may be brought about by the Discussion
Draft of the Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance circulated on
April 30, 2015 (“Discussion Draft”). 8 In examining the Restatement
approach to the duty to settle, I examine three salient points: the source
of the duty to settle, the conduct of the insurer, and the remedies for
breach. This Article will deal specifically with sections 24 and 27 of the
ALI’s Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance.9
I. THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE
With the Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance, the ALI
expects to “cover[] the law of contracts in the liability insurance context,
liability insurance coverage, and the management of insured liabilities.” 10
Although this is an ambitious undertaking, the payoff can be enormous
in terms of affecting the course of liability insurance law.

adhere to the old “duty to settle” language as it is the nearly unanimous description used by
courts.
5. See generally About ALI: Institute Projects, A.L.I., https://www.ali.org/aboutali/institute-projects/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2015) (describing the aim of “Principles” projects).
6. Although some citations will reflect the original designation, this Article will refer
to all as the Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance.
7. Projects: Restatement of the Law, Liability Insurance, supra note 3.
8. The Discussion Draft circulated by the ALI on April 30, 2015 follows Tentative
Draft No. 2.
9. Discussion Draft sections 24 and 27 that are discussed herein were numbered 27
and 30 respectively in Tentative Draft No. 2. These will hereafter be referred to as section
24 and section 27.
10. Projects: Restatement of the Law, Liability Insurance, supra note 3.
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The Restatements have had a profound influence on American
common law. With uncharacteristic immodesty, the ALI recognizes that
the Restatements have an “unparalleled reputation for excellence and
objectivity”11 in the undertaking to provide certainty in the law and “tell
[the] judges and lawyers what the law [is].” 12 According to the ALI, this
reputation is evidenced by the respect courts have accorded ALI
publications.13 By the first half of 2014, United States courts had cited
various provisions of the Restatements and Principles of the Law 195,000
times.14 These assertions are unsurprising, but perhaps do not fully
capture the Restatements’ influence on American common law.
Perhaps the most well-known example of the Restatements’ effect on
American law is Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The
section imposed strict liability for tort injuries caused by products. 15
Although Section 402A was modeled after a single California case
imposing strict liability for products injuries, it was rapidly adopted by
many courts.16 Eventually, faced with the difficulty of applying strict
liability to products with little precedential guidance, courts began to
question the universal applicability of strict liability to all products
liability cases.17 What resulted was a complex body of products liability
law that examines nearly every facet of a product’s inception through its
production, distribution, and sale.18
The Restatements’ effect on contract law, though perhaps more
subtle, is no less substantial. A study of six sections of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts—15(1)(b), 86, 87(2), 89, 139, and 153—revealed
that in 241 cases studied, all but eight cases simply deferred to the new
rules.19 The cases cited the sections as if they were citing a statute or
code.20 This represents a truth apparently accepted 21 within the legal

11. AM. LAW INST., ANNUAL REPORT 2013–2014, at 12 (2014), https://www.ali.org/media/
filer_public/1a/1e/1a1e43dc-0141-4cf3-82df-3fd210cb0527/2013-2014_annual_report.pdf.
12. About ALI: Institute Projects, supra note 5.
13. AM. LAW INST., supra note 11, at 12.
14. Id. This number could be greater, as this only reflects published decisions. Id.
15. See David A. Logan, When the Restatement Is Not a Restatement: The Curious Case
of the “Flagrant Trespasser,” 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1448, 1457–59 (2011).
16. See id.
17. Id. at 1458–59.
18. See Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI
Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 637–38 (1995).
19. Gregory E. Maggs, Ipse Dixit: The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the
Modern Development of Contract Law, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 508, 511–12 (1998).
20. Id. at 513.
21. That is, accepted as true but not necessarily accepted as desirable.
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community at large: the Restatements affect substantive law. 22 This
truism informs Professor Wolfram’s perception that “[s]uch realizations
should serve to caution a Restatement-drafter who may otherwise be
tempted to boldness.”23
With this backdrop, in formulating a Restatement, the Reporters—
the Restatement-drafters—face a delicate task. The fifty states (not
including the District of Columbia or United States territories such as
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Guam) that make judgments about a
body of law will necessarily arrive at different results regarding each part
of that body of law. That said, there is a surprisingly strong consensus
among the states that a duty to settle is a firmly entrenched aspect of an
insurer’s obligations to an insured.24 Thereafter, the views as to the
source of the obligation, the precise extent of an insurer’s obligations, and
the remedies for breach diverge and there is a wide-ranging spectrum of
approaches as to each.25
The Reporters’ daunting responsibility is to select a solution that is
defensible, that is likely to be (or has already been) adopted by a
significant number of states, and that is correct. These are not
22. Kulko v. Superior Court is an example of the United States Supreme Court
accepting the Restatement as settled law in the context of due process. 436 U.S. 84, 96
(1978) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (AM. LAW INST. 1971)).
Charles W. Wolfram provided evidence of this phenomenon in his article offering
insight into the Restatement drafting process. See Charles W. Wolfram, Bismarck’s
Sausages and the ALI’s Restatements, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817 (1998). Wolfram recounts the
attempts of the insurance industry to influence the Restatement’s Reporters’ inclusion of
sections of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers that were perceived as placing
burdens on insurance companies’ counsel. Id. at 821–24. This sort of lobbying would not be
perceived as necessary if the Restatements did not affect substantive law.
At one point, in the Virgin Islands and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands, the statutes implementing the Restatements as common law elevated the authority
of the Restatements “to controlling authority in matters of first impression.” Kristen David
Adams, The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons from the Restatement Movement, 33 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 423, 425–26 (2004). The Virgin Islands has since retreated from that position and now
recognizes that its courts are free to craft common law. Banks v. Int’l Rental & Leasing
Corp., 55 V.I. 967, 980 (2011).
23. Wolfram, supra note 22, at 817.
24. See David A. Hyman, Bernard Black & Charles Silver, Settlement at Policy Limits
and the Duty to Settle: Evidence from Texas, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 48, 49 (2011)
(“[A]lmost all states impose a duty to settle on insurers.”); Syverud, supra note 2, at 1120–
21.
25. Professor Jay Feinman has noted the dearth of market and regulatory solutions to
the problem of claims practices. Jay M. Feinman, The Regulation of Insurance Claim
Practices, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 3–4) (on file with
author). His observation applies equally to the duty to settle. Regulators are underresourced and subject to capture. Id. (manuscript at 28). Information asymmetry
necessarily limits any market solution. Id. (manuscript at 27, 30).
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necessarily overlapping considerations. Thus, we must be especially
diligent in the construction of the insurer’s duty to settle within this
current draft with an eye to the practical consequences and long-term
effects of any change.
In the discussion that follows, I broadly outline the range of choices
in each of three different aspects of the duty to settle. Within each of
these aspects I describe the choice made by the Reporters in the
Discussion Draft and my own evaluation of the Reporters’ approach. My
aim is to provide a scholarly and analytical explication of the insurer’s
duty to settle to help inform the crafting of the Restatement.
II. THE BOUNDARIES OF THE DUTY TO SETTLE
The boundaries of the duty to settle can be best described as inexact.
Despite the well-settled nature of the duty, the duty is neither
articulated in policy language nor addressed in any state statute. 26 This
26. The California Supreme Court has explained that an insurer has the duty to settle
even when “express terms of the policy do not impose the duty.” Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co. of
New Haven, 426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal. 1967) (in bank) (citing Comunale v. Traders & Gen.
Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 201 (Cal. 1958) (in bank)); see also Paul E.B. Glad, Ronald D. Kent &
Michael Barnes, Understanding Liability Insurance, in 3 NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW
PRACTICE GUIDE: SEPARATE LINES OF INSURANCE § 30.02, at 30-15 to 30-16 (Jeffrey E.
Thomas, Leo P. Martinez, Marc S. Mayerson & Douglas R. Richmond eds., 2015) (“The
duties to investigate and to settle within the policy limits are not express duties in the
insurance policy, but rather are implied from the principal duties to defend and to
indemnify.”); ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE
LAW § 112, at 832 (5th ed. 2012) (“Liability insurance policies . . . do not by their terms
impose a duty to settle . . . .”); James M. Fischer, Insurer or Policyholder Control of the
Defense and the Duty to Fund Settlements, 2 NEV. L.J. 1, 3 n.6 (2002) (“The standard
liability insurance contract does not contractually obligate the insurer to settle; rather, the
obligation has been judicially imposed.”).
Some aspects of the duty to settle are addressed by the Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act. The duty to settle as defined in California case law is that “[w]hen there is
great risk of a recovery beyond the policy limits so that the most reasonable manner of
disposing of the claim is a settlement which can be made within those limits, a
consideration in good faith of the insured’s interest requires the insurer to settle the claim.”
Comunale, 328 P.2d at 201. The duty to settle is formulated differently under the Unfair
Claims Settlement Practices Act.
The Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act provides that an insurer commits an
unfair claims practice by “[n]ot attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and
equitable settlement of claims submitted in which liability has become reasonably clear”
and “[a]ttempting to settle or settling claims for less than the amount that a reasonable
person would believe the insured or beneficiary was entitled by reference to written or
printed advertising material accompanying or made part of an application.” UNFAIR CLAIMS
SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT § 4 (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS 1997); accord CAL. INS. CODE
§ 790.03 (West 2013); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2601 (McKinney 2015); 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 21.203(4) (West 1998).
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lack of precision has likely contributed to courts’ adoption of differing
standards under which the duty to settle arises.
In examining the Discussion Draft’s approach to the duty to settle, I
examine three salient points: the source of the duty to settle, the conduct
of the insurer, and the remedies for breach. Limiting my discussion to
these few points is intentional. The analysis can be kept to a manageable
length and, more importantly, the interrelationship among these aspects
of the duty to settle can be explored without delving into undue
complexity.
A. The Source of the Duty to Settle
The source of the duty to settle is not self-evident, although it raises
interesting and divergent issues.27 On the one hand, it could be argued
that the source of the duty is irrelevant given the universal acceptance of
the concept of a duty to settle—academics who argue otherwise are many
angels dancing on the head of a pin. On the other hand, the precise
source of the duty—whether it sounds in tort or contract—can have a
significant effect on the range of remedies for breach of the duty. Thus,
the danger of incorrect nomenclature emerges because the nature of the
relationship defines the rights and duties of the parties, and it is
therefore important not to mischaracterize the relationship.
Three distinct approaches emerge in ferreting out the source of the
duty to settle. The first of these is based in contract, the second is based
in tort, and the last is a hybrid of the two.
1. Contract theory
With the simplest approach, there is an explicit recognition that the
duty to settle is a component of an insurer’s contractual duty to
In addition to the different formulation referencing advertising inducements, there
is no mechanism for direct redress to an insured for an insurer’s breach of the duty to settle.
Violation of the proscriptions of the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act provides for a
range of sanctions that would be easily dwarfed in most duty to settle cases. For example,
even flagrant violations in conscious disregard of the Act trigger only a $25,000 penalty per
violation. UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT § 6. While some states have adopted
higher penalties, the amounts are small and the primary redress for breach of the duty to
settle remains that which is provided by the common law of most states. E.g., CAL. INS.
CODE § 790.035 (allowing up to $10,000 for willful violations).
27. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 26, § 112[c], at 832. The Reporters describe the
duty to settle “as a special application of the general contract law duty of good faith and fair
dealing in the context of insurance policies that granted the insurer some discretion over
the settlement of an insured liability claim.” RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 24
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015).
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indemnify and duty to defend.28 In these cases, the focus is entirely on
the contractual nature of the insurance policy.29 According to this view,
the action enforcing any consequent breach of the duty to settle is based
on a breach of contract.30 Implicit duties, such as the duty to settle,
“merely seek to broaden the conduct which constitutes breach of contract”
within the confines of the insurance contract. 31 Thus, a breach of the duty
to settle, even if implicit, gives rise to contract remedies only and does
not implicate tort remedies.32
2. Tort Theory
The duty to settle based in tort proceeds on the theory that because
the duty to settle is not an express contractual duty, a breach of the duty
must sound in tort as a sort of default position.33 As one court explained:
In an action for failure to settle within the policy limits, the
insurance company is charged with acting in a fiduciary capacity
as an attorney in fact representing the insured’s interest in
litigation. The company’s interest comes into conflict with that of
the insured’s while representing him; and, arguably, acting in its
own interests to the detriment of the insured’s interest while
acting in such a fiduciary capacity is a tort.34

28. Mesmer v. Md. Auto. Ins. Fund, 725 A.2d 1053, 1060–64 (Md. 1999).
29. See, e.g., Glenn v. Fleming, 799 P.2d 79, 89 (Kan. 1990) (quoting Gilley v. Farmer,
485 P.2d 1284, 1290 (Kan. 1971)).
30. Id. at 90 (citing Guarantee Abstract & Title Co. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 652
P.2d 665, 667 (Kan. 1982)).
31. Id. at 89 (quoting Guarantee Abstract & Title Co., 652 P.2d at 669). In Glenn, the
Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged its own role in creating some confusion:
We have adopted . . . the principle that the insurer’s duties are contractually based
and then approved a tort standard of care for determining when the contract duty
has been breached. Perhaps this contract/tort relationship has contributed to the
confusion arising from our efforts to describe the duty of good faith and to identify
the situations involving bad faith/negligent duty to settle and to defend.
Id. at 90.
32. See id. at 89; see also infra Section II.C.1.
33. Mesmer, 725 A.2d at 1063.
34. Id. (quoting Farris v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 587 P.2d 1015, 1018−19 (Or. 1978) (en
banc)).
One well-respected and prolific author argues that contract law has traditionally
been free of fiduciary relationships—insurance law should be similarly treated in this view.
Douglas R. Richmond, Trust Me: Insurers Are Not Fiduciaries to Their Insureds, 88 KY. L.J.
1, 5–6 (1999–2000) (characterizing the insured/insurer relationship as a fiduciary
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More precision is possible. An insured who has given up her right to
defend a claim and her control over settlement puts the insurer in a
fiduciary capacity. Thus the exercise of judgment by the insurer must be
based on thorough evaluation and informed interaction with the
insured.35 The nature of the tort is that the insurer has acted improperly
in defending its insured.36 This was Judge Keeton’s view. He long ago
saw the duty to settle as a tort concept. 37
Some courts suggest that the tort involved need not necessarily be
limited to a breach of such fiduciary duty.38 Where the insurer’s conduct
is the equivalent of “dishonesty, fraud, and concealment,” 39 liability for
its breach of the duty to settle is also possible. 40 Nonetheless, it is also
clear that such seemingly intentional conduct is not a predicate to finding
an insurer has breached its duty to settle—that is, conduct short of
dishonesty, fraud, and concealment may suffice. 41 The larger point is that
relationship might well deprive the insurer of its reasonable inclination to protect its own
interests).
As the courts in Utah recognize:
An insurer’s failure to act in good faith exposes its insured to a judgment and
personal liability in excess of the policy limits. In essence, the contract itself creates
a fiduciary relationship because of the trust and reliance placed in the insurer by
its insured. The insured is wholly dependent upon the insurer to see that, in
dealing with claims by third parties, the insured’s best interests are protected. In
addition, when dealing with third parties, the insurer acts as an agent for the
insured with respect to the disputed claim. Wholly apart from the contractual
obligations undertaken by the parties, the law imposes upon all agents a fiduciary
obligation to their principals with respect to matters falling within the scope of
their agency.
Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 799−800 (Utah 1985) (citations omitted)
(distinguishing first party actions but acknowledging the insured’s exposure in third party
claims).
35. Michael F. Aylward, Understanding Bad Faith, in 1 NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE
LAW PRACTICE GUIDE: COVERAGE ANALYSIS AND PRELITIGATION PROCEDURES § 6.08[2], at 626 (Jeffrey E. Thomas, Leo P. Martinez, Marc S. Mayerson & Douglas R. Richmond eds.,
2015); see Asermely v. Allstate Ins. Co., 728 A.2d 461, 464 (R.I. 1999) (per curiam) (“An
insurance company’s fiduciary obligations include a duty to consider seriously a plaintiff’s
reasonable offer to settle within the policy limits.”); Prosser v. Leuck, 592 N.W.2d 178, 182
(Wis. 1999) (“By . . . taking control of settlement or litigation the insurer assumes a
fiduciary duty on behalf of the insured.”).
36. Mesmer, 725 A.2d at 1063 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 639 A.2d 652, 658
(Md. 1994)).
37. Keeton, supra note 1, at 1138 n.5.
38. See, e.g., Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co. of New Haven, 426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal. 1967) (in
bank).
39. Id. (first citing Critz v. Farmers Ins. Grp., 41 Cal. Rptr. 401 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964);
then citing Palmer v. Fin. Indem. Co., 30 Cal. Rptr. 204, 208 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); and then
citing Davy v. Pub. Nat’l Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 488, 492–93 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960)).
40. Id. at 176–77.
41. Id. at 177.
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by grounding the duty to settle in tort, a court has a different, and
possibly broader, range of remedies to consider when the duty is
breached.42
3. Hybrid Contract/Tort Theory
The last approach, best described as a hybrid, seeks to ground an
insurer’s duty to settle in terms of both contract and tort. 43 There is,
however, scant explanation for this hybrid approach. A series of wellknown California cases on the subject seem to state the hybrid nature of
the duty to settle as a matter of fact. 44 While the cases do not say as
much, one is left with the impression that the hybrid approach is less
doctrinally defensible than it is a means to expand the range of remedies
for breach of the duty to settle. This tendency is understandable if the
overwhelming sentiment is informed by a strong public policy to protect
against harm.45
4. The Reporters’ Choice
The Reporters’ choice of underlying theory in the Restatement of the
Law of Liability Insurance is made tacitly. Although the text of section
24, the Comment, and the Reporters’ Note are all silent as to the
42. See infra Section II.C.2.
43. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 912 F. Supp. 2d 321,
340−41 (D. Md. 2012); Crisci, 426 P.2d at 179.
44. Crisci, 426 P.2d at 178–79 (holding that the duty to settle sounds in contract and
“breach [of the duty to settle] also constitutes a tort”); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.,
328 P.2d 198, 203 (Cal. 1958) (in bank) (holding that a breach of the duty to settle sounds in
both contract and tort).
This lack of support for the hybrid approach regarding the duty to settle does not
suggest a lack of well-developed material on the marriage of contracts and torts generally.
See generally Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661
(1989) (discussing the problem of classification of doctrine and the boundary between
contract and tort); Jay Feinman & Marc Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEO. L.J. 875,
883−84 (1985) (explaining generally that in certain factual scenarios, “contract and tort
[have] merged to an extent that it would be useful to combine them theoretically and
pedagogically . . . [, specifically,] a situation for which either contractual or delictual
responsibility seems appropriate”); Matthew J. Barrett, Note, “Contort”: Tortious Breach of
the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Noninsurance, Commercial
Contracts—Its Existence and Desirability, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 510, 510 (1985)
(explaining that courts have recognized these factual mergers, or “contorts,” specifically in
the realm of insurance contracts because “[b]reach of [the] implied covenant [of good faith
and fair dealing] creates a cause of action in contract” and that “[b]eginning twenty-five
years ago, some courts also recognized a cause of action in tort for breach of this implied
covenant in insurance contracts”).
45. Crisci, 426 P.2d at 178−79.
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underlying theories, section 24(3) seems to adopt a purely contractual
approach by limiting an insurer’s obligation to the liability limits of the
policy.46
The Reporters are more explicit in the Comment to section 27 in
which they note that although they are agnostic as to the doctrinal
underpinnings of the section, the principles in section 27 are compatible
with a more expansive foreseeability approach that more nearly
resembles a tort approach.47 Essentially, the Reporters have chosen, for
section 27 at least, a one-size-fits-all approach, differentiating torts and
contracts by the differing notions of proximate cause and reasonable
foreseeability. Nevertheless, the Reporters have not explicitly identified
the doctrinal foundation of their approach.
A big-picture perspective is useful at this point. The importance of
remedies cannot be overstated; indeed, the available remedies are often
the primary reason for litigation. The availability and scope of a given
remedy flow directly from the substantive right violated. 48 Thus, the way
one perceives breach of the duty to settle informs the choice of the
consequent remedy.
With that limitation in mind, if one views the breach of the duty to
settle as a contract breach, one set of remedies suggests itself. If the
breach of the duty to settle is a tort, or if breach of the contract’s implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a tort, a different set of
remedies arises. As a general proposition, those jurisdictions that
subscribe to a tort theory of the breach of the duty to settle expose the
insurer to a wider array of damages, including punitive damages.
Contract remedies are significantly more restrictive. These are discussed
in the following sections.
B. The Insurer’s Conduct
According to a treatise for which I serve as an editor, “[w]here a
primary insurer assumes the defense of its insured, it must exercise due
care in the conduct of that defense, including a duty to act reasonably in
response to settlement offers.”49 While the treatise articulates pro-insurer
46. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 24(3) (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft
2015).
47. Section 27, comment b provides: “Although this Section is agnostic as to the
doctrinal label, the broader approach to whether a loss is foreseeable, which is most
commonly associated with the tort-law label, is the proper approach.” Id. § 27 cmt. b.
48. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 1.6, at
25 (2d ed. 1993).
49. Aylward, supra note 35, § 6.08[2], at 6-26. The pro-insured description of the
insurer’s obligation is that an insurer has a fiduciary obligation “to act in the best interests

166

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:155

and pro-insured views of that duty, it does not provide an explanation or
even a rationale for such positions. Moreover, the treatise seems to adopt
a tort remedy approach to breaches of the duty to settle. 50 This Article is
an opportunity, if nothing else, to acknowledge the distinction and
highlight its implications.
For the moment, I will put aside the tort/contract distinction. I will
instead devote this part of the Article to describing the range of possible
insurer behavior that will constitute a breach of the duty to settle
whether in tort or in contract. Defining the behavior that constitutes a
breach of the duty to settle has proven remarkably elusive. This lack of
clear definition seems to trace its roots to the fact that the duty to settle
is an implicit one.51
To begin, it bears mention that there is nothing sinister in allowing
an insurer a certain amount of discretion in effectuating settlements. 52
By allowing the insurer such freedom of action, the insured is
discouraged from entering into collusive agreements with third parties,
and the insurer’s expertise and experience can be used to the fullest
advantage in a cost-effective way. Indeed, it is often the insurer’s money
that is in play.53
Still, as Dean Jerry and Douglas Richmond have observed, “the
insurer’s discretion is limited in substantial ways by judicially-created
rules.”54 The fuzziness in this area is a result of the wide range and
variety of these judicially-created rules.55 A short discussion of these
reveals that some of these rules may well be deficient in substantial
respects. For the purposes of this Article, I have arbitrarily created three
categories of limitations/insurer behavior that I use as a proxy for the
of its insureds in order to protect the insured from excess liability” and “to refrain from
conduct that demonstrates ‘greater concern for the insurer’s monetary interest than the
financial risk attendant to the insured’s situation.’” Id.
50. This tacit assumption that breach of the duty to settle sounds in tort is adopted by
Kent Syverud’s article. Syverud, supra note 2, at 1117–18.
51. Typically, the duty to settle arises from insurance contract provisions that require
the insurer to both assume defense of the claim and control the settlement decision.
Aylward, supra note 35, § 6.08[2], at 6-26; Glad, Kent & Barnes, supra note 26, § 30.02, at
30-15 to 30-16; Syverud, supra note 2, at 1118–19.
52. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 188 (1986) (“Insurers are entitled to settle, even against the wishes of the insured,
and they are entitled to refuse to settle even if the insured desires the case against him
settled.”); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 26, at 832 (stating that insurers have “a right to
settle, or not to settle, as the insurer in the exercise of its discretion sees fit”).
53. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 26, at 832–33 (outlining a similar set of reasons to
allow insurer control over settlement); Syverud, supra note 2, at 1137–38 (same).
54. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 26, at 832.
55. Keeton, supra note 1, at 1139 (“Courts have disagreed regarding the standard used
in defining [the] duty to settle . . . .”); Syverud, supra note 2, at 1122.
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spectrum of possibilities. I do this to both simplify the analysis as well as
to highlight the difficulty of ascribing precise standards for insurer
behavior—a matter that the Reporters take very much to heart.
1. The Pro-Insurer Approach
One end of a spectrum of insurer behavior can be represented by the
decidedly pro-insurer view that “failure to settle is not actionable in the
absence of subjective culpability.”56 Thus, an insurer’s behavior must be
either intentional or reckless in order to constitute a breach of the duty to
settle.57 This more nearly describes conduct necessary to ascribe the label
“bad faith” to an insurer’s conduct—the “arbitrary, reckless, indifferent,
or intentional disregard of the interests of the person owed a duty.” 58
Thus, in states that adopt the pro-insurer view, an insured faces a
significant hurdle to recovery. For example, an insured seeking recovery
beyond the policy limits for an insurer’s breach of the duty to settle must
show the insurer acted with “conscious or knowing indifference” as to the
insured’s interests.59
2. The Middle Approach
In the large middle between a nearly strict liability standard and an
intentional/reckless conduct standard of behavior lie a number of
different approaches which, for present purposes, I somewhat lump
together in an undifferentiated mass. In this large middle, an insurer
breaches its duty to settle and “is liable only if its behavior in failing to
settle departs from some norm by a margin a jury can fairly label
‘negligent,’ ‘bad faith’ (a standard purportedly more onerous than
negligence), or some combination of the two.” 60
Some courts in this large middle adopt a distinction between an
insurer’s bad faith failure to settle and an insurer’s decision to continue
to defend a claim that has a “real and substantial” chance of a judgment

56. Aylward, supra note 35, § 6.08[2], at 6-26.
57. Id.
58. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 26, at 168.
59. Pavia v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 626 N.E.2d 24, 27–28 (N.Y. 1993)
(“[E]stablished precedent clearly bars a ‘bad faith’ prosecution for conduct amounting to
ordinary negligence.”).
60. Syverud, supra note 2, at 1122; accord Keeton, supra note 1, at 1140 (“The
distinction between the ‘bad faith rule’ and the ‘negligence rule’ is less marked than these
terms would suggest.”).
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within the policy limits.61 There are also any number of formulations that
rely on a determination of “reasonableness” without undertaking any
kind of definition of what constitutes reasonableness. 62
Other courts, again in this broad middle, employ a negligence
standard to determine whether an insurer has breached its duty to
settle.63 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the test
for an insurer’s negligence “is not whether a reasonable insurer might
have settled the case within the policy limits, but rather whether no
reasonable insurer would have failed to settle the case within the policy
limits.”64 Under this test, the insured must “prove that the plaintiff in the
underlying action would have settled the claim within the policy limits
and that, assuming the insurer’s unlimited exposure[,] . . . no reasonable
insurer would have refused the settlement offer or would have refused to
respond to the offer.”65 Under the language of this test, it is not difficult
to see why many authorities conclude that the difference between the bad
faith standard and the negligence standard exists in name only. 66
3. The Pro-Insured Approach
The other end of this wide spectrum is a pro-insured approach—a
strict liability norm. This approach would find the insurer liable for all
unsuccessful settlements.67 This approach would be untenable because a
corollary of the idea that an insurer has some discretion in discharging
its duty to settle is that the insurer cannot be held to a strict liability
standard if it is unsuccessful in settling. A strict liability standard would
imply no discretion at all in settling. At the time of Kent Syverud’s article
61. DeWalt v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 513 F. Supp. 2d 287, 296 (E.D. Pa. 2007); see also
Anglo-Am. Ins. Co. v. Molin, 670 A.2d 194, 197–98 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) (holding that an
insurer may “reject a settlement offer and insist on litigation if it has a bona fide belief that
it has a good possibility of succeeding on the merits” (citing Cowden v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 134 A.2d 223 (Pa. 1957))).
62. “Where a primary insurer assumes the defense of its insured, it must exercise due
care in the conduct of that defense, including a duty to act reasonably in response to
settlement offers.” Aylward, supra note 35, § 6.08[2], at 6-26.
63. Id. § 6.08[3][b], at 6-29.
64. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 628 N.E.2d 14, 18 (Mass. 1994) (emphasis
added).
65. Id.; see also Carrier Express, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 860 F. Supp. 1465, 1478–79
(N.D. Ala. 1994) (“If the insurer fails to exercise such reasonable or ordinary care, then it
has breached its duty and is guilty of negligence.”).
66. See Bollinger v. Nuss, 449 P.2d 502, 509–10 (Kan. 1969).
67. Of course, lack of success is in the eye of the beholder and I concede the imprecision
of this observation. This imprecision is partially addressed in the succeeding Part II.C of
this Article.
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twenty-five years ago, no state had held an insurer to a standard of strict
liability for an unsuccessful settlement, remaining a trend that has held
up through the more recent past. 68
There is another pro-insured interpretation of the insurer’s obligation
that is just shy of a strict liability approach. Under this approach, the
insurer has a fiduciary obligation “‘to act in the best interests of its
insureds in order to protect the insured from excess liability’ and to
refrain from conduct that demonstrates ‘greater concern for the insurer’s
monetary interest than the financial risk attendant to the insured’s
situation.’”69 This is the approach generally taken in California. 70
California’s formulation is the result of a multi-step process. In
California, an insurer’s duty to settle is traced to the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing present in all contracts. 71 The implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires parties to a contract to
refrain from acting in any way that would inhibit the other party from
receiving the benefits of their agreement. 72 Because settlement of claims
without litigation is one of the ways an insured receives one of the
benefits of an insurance policy—indemnification—the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing imposes the duty to settle the claim within the
policy limits.73 A claim based on a failure to settle generally requires that
the insurer is defending or has defended the underlying case and that the
policy covers the subject matter of the settlement.74 Further, the cause of
action requires that a third-party claimant make an offer or demand
settlement at or below the policy limits, that the insurer’s refusal of that
offer was unreasonable, and that a judgment in excess of the policy limits
68. Syverud, supra note 2, at 1122; accord JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 26, at 837. It
has been observed that there have been close calls. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 26, at
837 n.272 (describing one court’s flirtation with strict liability and pointing to California’s
near strict liability approach).
69. Aylward, supra note 35, § 6.08[2], at 6-26. Although the Asermely v. Allstate
Insurance Co. court essentially used the California formulation of the insurer’s duty, the per
curiam opinion states “the insurer is liable for the amount that exceeds the policy limits,
unless it can show that the insured was unwilling to accept the offer of settlement.” 728
A.2d 461, 464 (R.I. 1999) (per curiam). Dean Jerry and Douglas Richmond did not
unreasonably construe this statement as almost adopting, without explicitly saying, a strict
liability standard. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 26, at 838.
70. Asermely, 728 A.2d at 464. Reliance on California law is not misplaced in this
instance given that it “is not materially different in any systematic sense from the common
law of other jurisdictions.” TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY:
CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 507 (3d ed. 2013).
71. Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co. of New Haven, 426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal. 1967) (in bank) (citing
Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 201 (Cal. 1958) (in bank)).
72. Id. (citing Comunale, 328 P.2d at 201).
73. Id. (citing Comunale, 328 P.2d at 201).
74. Aylward, supra note 35, § 6.08[3], at 6-27.

170

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:155

was entered against the insured.75 However, the inquiry usually centers
on whether the insurer’s refusal of an offer was unreasonable. 76
In assessing reasonableness, the California standard asks whether
the insurer refused settlement in bad faith and requires insurers to “give
the interests of the insured at least as much consideration as it gives to
its own interests.”77 To determine whether the insurer gave as much
consideration to the insured’s interests as to its own interests, “the test is
whether a prudent insurer without policy limits would have accepted the
settlement offer.”78 Many states adopt essentially the same formulation.79
It deserves mention that this formulation lies at the end of the spectrum
nearest the strict liability approach.

75. Id. The Reporters theoretically take a more expansive view by imposing liability for
an insurer’s failure to make a reasonable settlement decision. See RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 24 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015).
76. Syverud, supra note 2, at 1123.
77. Crisci, 426 P.2d at 176 (citing Comunale, 328 P.2d at 201). In Wade v. EMCASCO
Insurance Co., the Tenth Circuit explained that the relevant question in determining bad
faith centers on “the degree of consideration which an insurer must give to those interests of
the insured which conflict with its own.” 483 F.3d 657, 666 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Bollinger v. Nuss, 449 P.2d 502, 510 (Kan. 1969)). The court echoed Crisci and held that
good faith execution of an insurer’s duty to settle allows an insurer to consider “its own
interests, but [the insurer] must also give at least equal consideration to the interests of the
insured.” Id. (quoting Bollinger, 449 P.2d at 510); see also Ambassador Ins. Co. v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 690 P.2d 1022, 1026 (N.M. 1984) (“[F]or the jury to find bad faith, it
must believe that [the insurer], in failing to settle within policy limits, was motivated by
self-interest or ill will.”).
78. Crisci, 426 P.2d at 176 (emphasis added).
79. See, e.g., Contreras v. U.S. Sec. Ins. Co., 927 So. 2d 16, 21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006);
Short v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 334 N.W.2d 384, 387–88 (Minn. 1983) (“This duty to exercise
‘good faith’ includes an obligation to view the situation as if there were no policy limits
applicable to the claim, and to give equal consideration to the financial exposure of the
insured.”); Eastham v. Or. Auto. Ins. Co., 540 P.2d 364, 367 (Or. 1975) (“Good faith requires
the insurer . . . to treat the conflicting interests of itself and the insured with impartiality,
giving equal consideration to both interests . . . [and, in this respect,] act as if there were no
policy limits applicable to the claim and as if the risk of loss was entirely its own.”); Tex.
Farmers Ins. Co. v. Soriano, 881 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Tex. 1994) (holding that “under Texas
law insurers must ‘exercise “that degree of care and diligence which an ordinarily prudent
person would exercise in the management of his own business” in responding to settlement
demands within policy limits’” (quoting Am. Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d
842, 848 (Tex. 1994)). Kent Syverud recognized that this so-called “disregard the limits”
approach so pervades case law surrounding the duty to settle “that some commentators
tacitly assume [it] is universally accepted,” notwithstanding that it has not been adopted by
the majority of states. Syverud, supra note 2, at 1122 n.23.
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4. The Reporters’ Approach
The Discussion Draft changes the landscape of the duty to settle in
several significant and not necessarily desirable ways. Section 24(2)
provides a formulation that is very close to the California formulation. It
provides that “[a] reasonable settlement decision is one that would be
made by a reasonable person who bears the sole financial responsibility
for the full amount of the potential judgment.” 80
The mischief in the Discussion Draft is subtle. It is done in the
Comments and Reporters’ Notes. The Reporters begin by suggesting that
an insurer “take into account the realistically possible outcomes of a trial
and, to the extent possible, weigh those outcomes according to their
likelihood.”81 While acknowledging the difficulty of this task, the
Reporters contrast this difficulty with the undesirability of a strict
liability standard.82 This is a false choice. There are sound and defensible
reasons to eschew strict liability in this context. The better comparison
would be with the insured-friendly California approach that is dominant,
rather than an approach that no court has actually adopted.
Thereafter the Reporters sprinkle a number of factors to consider in
determining the reasonableness of an insurer’s decision throughout the
Comments. These include consideration of expert testimony,83
consultation with the lawyer(s) involved in the underlying claim, 84 the
insurer’s failure to make settlement offers and counteroffers, 85 “failure to
conduct negotiations in a reasonable manner or to follow the
recommendation of its adjuster or chosen defense lawyer (including not
seeking the defense lawyer’s recommendation)[,] . . . failure to keep the
insured informed of within-limits offers or the risk of excess judgment,
and the provision of misleading information.” 86
The Reporters are not alone in making this choice. Both courts and
commentators have resorted to a list of relevant factors for a jury to
consider.87 For example, the Tenth Circuit explained that the jury could
consider the following factors:

80. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 24(2) (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft
2015).
81. Id. § 24 cmt. d.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. § 24 cmt. e.
86. Id. § 24 cmt. i.
87. See O’Neill v. Gallant Ins. Co., 769 N.E.2d 100, 106–09 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (listing
“seven factors pertinent to the assessment of bad faith”).
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(1) [T]he strength of the injured claimant’s case on the issues of
liability and damages; (2) attempts by the insurer to induce the
insured to contribute to a settlement; (3) failure of the insurer to
properly investigate the circumstances so as to ascertain the
evidence against the insured; (4) the insurer’s rejection of advice
of its own attorney or agent; (5) failure of the insurer to inform
the insured of a compromise offer; (6) the amount of financial risk
to which each party is exposed in the event of a refusal to settle;
(7) the fault of the insured in inducing the insurer’s rejection of
the compromise offer by misleading it as to the facts; and (8) any
other factors tending to establish or negate bad faith on the part
of the insurer.88

Twenty-five years ago, Kent Syverud saw that juries were provided “a thorough
description of how attorneys and claims adjustors evaluate the value of a lawsuit.” Syverud,
supra note 2, at 1126. According to him, juries said that the evidence considered in their
evaluation included:
the insurance company’s claims file; evaluations of the case value by claims
adjustors, the attorneys in the underlying tort action, and the original trial judge;
loss reserves established by insurance companies to cover the claim; and testimony
about the apparent strength of the plaintiff’s case and the insured’s defenses
(including the credibility of witnesses, the severity of injuries, and the likely legal
rulings).
Id. at 1124–26 (footnotes omitted).
88. Wade v. EMCASCO Ins. Co., 483 F.3d 657, 667 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bollinger
v. Nuss, 449 P.2d 502, 512 (Kan. 1969)); accord Mid-Am. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Commercial
Union Ins. Co., 587 N.E.2d 81, 84 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding, in part, that where the
insurer was aware of an offer to settle within the limits, the possibility of its own bad faith,
the personal liability of the insured, the risk of an excess judgment, and a significant
amount of time to settle within the policy limits, there was enough evidence for a jury to
determine the insurer acted in bad faith in failing to settle).
Dean Jerry and Douglas Richmond cite a similar list. The factors include:
(1) the insured’s probable liability; (2) the policy limits; (3) the extent of the
claimant’s damages; (4) the adequacy of the insurer’s investigation; (5) the quality
of the defense provided by the insurer; (6) whether the insurer heeded defense
counsel’s advice concerning settlement; (7) whether the insurer heeded its own
adjusters’ advice concerning settlement; (8) the insurer’s willingness to engage in
settlement negotiations; (9) whether the insurer advised the insured of all
settlement offers; (10) whether the insured made any misrepresentations that may
have misled the insurer with respect to settlement negotiations; and (11) any other
conduct by the insurer reasonably reflecting greater concern for its financial
interests than for its insured’s financial risk.
JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 26, at 841.
It should not be lost that the California approach essentially jettisons the first ten
factors on the Jerry/Richmond list in favor of reliance on the last factor by simply asking
whether the insurer has “give[n] the interests of the insured at least as much consideration
as it [has given] to its own interests” and “whether a prudent insurer without policy limits
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The effect of such lists is twofold. First, some lists include
consideration of the policy limits.89 Such lists, perhaps unintentionally so,
effectively convert analysis to a regard-the-limits rule. Second, the
compilation of factors unnecessarily complicates matters for insureds.
While I appreciate that the Reporters’ intent might have been to flesh out
what is meant by the language “whether a prudent insurer without policy
limits would have accepted the settlement offer,” the practical effect of
resorting to a list of factors may be to dilute the focus on the answer to
the single inquiry.
In Wade v. EMCASCO Insurance Co., the Tenth Circuit explained
that the relevant question in determining bad faith centers on “the
degree of consideration which an insurer must give to those interests of
the insured which conflict with its own.”90 The Wade court echoed Crisci
and held that good faith execution of an insurer’s duty to settle allows an
insurer to consider “its own interests, but [the insurer] must also give at
least equal consideration to the interests of the insured.”91 Courts have
essentially collapsed the multifactor inquiry into one step to simplify the
analysis. In Wade, the use of multiple factors focused on the single
inquiry at one end of the insurer-behavior spectrum.
By deemphasizing focus on a single factor, in contrast to what is done
in California and a host of other states, an insurer is given significantly
more latitude to show a lack of untoward behavior. In doing so, the
Reporters necessarily arrive at a more pro-insurer position than would
otherwise be the case. By contrast, case law has aligned itself nearer to
the California end of the spectrum. This is not to advocate a strict
would have accepted the settlement offer.” Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co. of New Haven, 426 P.2d
173, 176 (Cal. 1967) (in bank).
The treatise for which I serve as an editor also cites a list of factors to consider.
These include:
 the probability of the insured’s liability;
 the extent of the damages claimed;
 the amount of the policy limits;
 the adequacy of the insurer’s investigation; and
 the openness of communications between the insurer and the insured.
Aylward, supra note 35, § 6.08[3][b], at 6-29.
89. Dean Jerry, Douglas Richmond, and the New Appleman Insurance Law Practice
Guide include the policy limits as a factor. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 26, at 841;
Aylward, supra note 35, § 6.08[3][b], at 6-29.
90. Wade, 483 F.3d at 666 (quoting Bollinger, 449 P.2d at 510).
91. Id. (quoting Bollinger, 449 P.2d at 510); see also Ambassador Ins. Co. v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 690 P.2d 1022, 1026 (N.M. 1984) (“[F]or the jury to find bad faith, it
must believe that [the insurer], in failing to settle within policy limits, was motivated by
self-interest or ill will.”).
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liability approach—again, there are sound reasons not to do so—but the
possibility of a strict liability approach should not be used as a basis for
moving the needle closer to the middle of the spectrum than is reflected
in the case law. The subtle move to a range of factors rather than one—
the California approach—has the effect of moving the needle closer to the
middle.
The existence of such a wide range invites a view of insurer conduct
that may be too generous to insurers at the expense of insureds. It should
be possible to make a conscious choice to opt for a regime that more
clearly resembles the existing California approach. While the recognition
of this broad middle does exactly that, there is little justification to
depart from what has worked in the majority of states that have
recognized the plight faced by insureds who turn over control of litigation
and settlement to insurers.
While the California approach may require an inquiry into one or
more of the factors that are outlined above, all of these factors are aimed
at the single determination of whether a prudent insurer without policy
limits would have accepted the settlement offer. The California approach
is preferable because it is more predictable and balances the interests of
the parties. It also puts the insurer in the insured’s shoes, the effect of
which encourages courts to consider the insured’s interest no matter the
expected value of the claim. This kind of clarity is good. As Professor Jay
Feinman observes, this “standard provides a substantial guide for
insurer’s behavior.”92
Section 24(1) provides that “[t]he duty [to make reasonable
settlement decisions] is owed only with respect to claims that expose the
insured to . . . liability in excess of the policy limits.”93 The explanation
for this approach is that the insurer is already motivated to settle claims
of the insurer’s existing contractual liability for those claims. 94 Implicit in
this explanation may also be the idea that any judgment within the
policy’s limits, whether the insurer settles the suit or opts to try the case,
is “of no concern to the insured.”95
However, not imposing a duty to act reasonably in this context seems
to go too far. One might ask whether an insurer can act unreasonably but
92. Feinman, supra note 25 (manuscript at 31).
93. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 24(1) (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft
2015).
94. Id. § 24 cmt. a.
95. Milroy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 151 P.3d 922, 928–29 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006) (quoting
A.W. Huss Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 735 F.2d 246, 250 (7th Cir. 1984)). In Milroy, the court
found that the insured had incurred minimal harm and that the insurer had acted
diligently without bad faith in taking the case to trial. Id. at 929.
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nonetheless escape liability through the accident of settlement within the
policy limits. Moreover, the possibility of an insurer being motivated in
the way suggested is subject to serious question. This last point can be
illustrated by a number of points.
First, a basic tenet of contract law is that neither party should act in
a way to deprive the other of their bargain. 96 One part of that bargain is
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 97 This is implicit in
the cases that recognize that the duties owed by an insurer that breaches
are different than those of an insurer that meets its obligation. There is a
significant trend of courts broadening the range of possible remedies for
breach of the duty to settle. Indeed most states subscribe to the notion
that an insurer will certainly be liable for any excess verdict that results
from a breach of its duty to settle,98 although the existence of an excess
judgment is not required in order to maintain a case against a breaching
insurer.99
Second, the interests of insurer and insured are not necessarily
aligned. An insurer can be motivated by its desire to maintain its
reputation for taking hard stances, by the size of its reserves, and by its
desire to keep its money from being paid out to claimants. In all events
these might well work to the detriment of an insured.
Third, peace of mind is part of the bargain. Litigation that results in
a judgment within the limits takes its toll, even on the sophisticated
insureds. The harm to insureds is not necessarily limited to the
settlement amount—even though within the policy limits.100 A majority
of the New York Court of Appeals in Bi-Economy Market, Inc. v.
Harleysville Insurance Co. of New York explained that an insurance
contract is distinguished from “pure ‘agreements to pay’” because an
insured bargains not just for indemnification, but also for the insurer’s
good faith handling of claims. 101 In surrendering defense and control of
settlement negotiations to the insurer, an insured also contracts to
96. Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co. of New Haven, 426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal. 1967) (in bank) (citing
Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 200 (Cal. 1958)); see Leo P. Martinez, A
Unified Theory of Insurance Risk, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 713, 735–38, 758 (2013).
97. Crisci, 426 P.2d at 176.
98. Aylward, supra note 35, § 6.08[2], at 6-27.
99. Id. § 6.08[3], at 6-27. Still, lack of an excess judgment may go to the question of
harm.
100. The Reporters seem to ascribe to the logic articulated in the dissent of a recent New
York case. According to the dissent in Bi-Economy Market, Inc. v. Harleysville Insurance Co.
of New York, “in insurance contracts . . . the parties have already told us what damages
they contemplated; . . . it is payment equal to the losses covered by the policy.” 886 N.E.2d
127, 134 (N.Y. 2008) (Smith, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 130 (majority opinion).
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receive a performance-based benefit. Limiting an insurer’s obligation to
act in good faith and restricting the range of remedies when recovery is
less than the policy’s liability limits jeopardizes an insured’s receipt of all
of the benefits for which it contracted.
Fourth, and related to the last point, there are a myriad of implicit
obligations in any insurance policy. For an insurer that is relieved of its
obligation to act reasonably in the context of the duty to settle, it may be
too tempting to act unreasonably in other areas.
Finally, by allowing the policy limits to affect the standards by which
insurer behavior is judged and to play a role in the remedy that is
available to the insured, the Reporters seem to discount, at least in this
regard, the salutary “disregard-the-limits” approach championed by
Judge Keeton in his own influential work.102
The “disregard-the-limits” concept provides a workable standard by
which fact-finders can assess the insurer’s settlement behavior. 103
Originally articulated by Judge Keeton, the standard seeks to address
the question of how much consideration an insurer must give to the
interest of its insured.104 In jurisdictions that examine the insurer’s
conduct under a negligence standard, the “disregard-the-limits” rule
aligns the parties’ interests by requiring the insurer to “use such care as
would have been used by an ordinarily prudent insurer with no policy
limit applicable to the claim.”105 An insurer then, is liable for failing to
settle “only if[] such ordinarily prudent insurer would consider that
choosing to try the case (rather than to settle . . . ) would be taking an
unreasonable risk—that is, trial would involve chances of unfavorable
results out of reasonable proportion to the chances of favorable
results.”106 In jurisdictions employing a bad faith framework, the
standard can be articulated as requiring the insurer to “in good faith
view the situation as it would if there were no policy limit applicable to
the claim.”107
The California Supreme Court adopted Judge Keeton’s “disregardthe-limits” rule in Crisci.108 The Crisci court held that the relevant

102. Keeton, supra note 1, at 1147–48.
103. See id. at 1142–48.
104. Id. at 1142.
105. Id. at 1147.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1148.
108. Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co. of New Haven, 426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal. 1967) (in bank). The
Reporters also cite to the following cases applying Keeton’s articulation of the “disregardthe-limits” rule: Herges v. Western Casualty & Surety. Co., 408 F.2d 1157, 1163–64 (8th Cir.
1969) and Koppie v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co., 210 N.W.2d 844, 848 (Iowa 1973).
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inquiry when considering “whether an insurer has given consideration to
the interests of [its] insured . . . is whether a prudent insurer without
policy limits would have accepted the settlement offer.” 109 In the New
Jersey Supreme Court’s view, “both interests can be served justly only if
the insurer treats any settlement offer as if it had full coverage for
whatever verdict might be recovered, regardless of policy limits, and
makes its decision to settle or to go to trial on that basis.”110 The Second
Circuit explained that “the insurer must conduct itself as though it alone
were liable for the entire amount of the judgment.” 111 Under the Second
Circuit’s articulation of the standard, the insurer is not only precluded
from considering the policy’s limits, but also from considering the
potential for reducing future settlement amounts or acting on the
insurer’s belief that the policy does not confer coverage. 112 Whether the
insurer met this standard is a question for the fact-finder.113
As the Reporters note in their extensive discussion, the “disregardthe-limits” formulation is the most widely used by courts to assess the
reasonableness of an insurer’s decision to settle or not.114 By
circumscribing an insurer’s behavior only if there is a recovery beyond
the policy limits, the Reporters seem to opt for an approach that requires
consideration of the limits.115 They effectively repeat this view with

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 24 reporters’ note c (AM. LAW INST., Discussion
Draft 2015).
109. Crisci, 426 P.2d at 176. Professor Syverud indicated that at the time of his article
“Keeton’s ‘disregard the limits’ standard . . . gained its most prominent endorsement from
[Crisci, which] so dominates case law on duty-to-settle doctrine that some commentators
tacitly assume the ‘disregard the limits’ standard is universally accepted.” Syverud, supra
note 2, at 1122 n.23. The Reporters recognize the dominance of Crisci in the Reporters’
Notes as well. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 24 reporters’ note c (AM. LAW
INST., Discussion Draft 2015). Professor Syverud noted, however, that the “disregard-thelimits” approach has been endorsed by courts in sixteen states, not fifty. Syverud, supra
note 2, at 1122 n.23.
110. Bowers v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass’n, 237 A.2d 857, 862 (N.J. 1968).
111. Schwartz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 539 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting
Johansen v. Cal. State Auto. Ass’n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 538 P.2d 744, 748 (Cal. 1975) (in
bank)).
112. Id. (quoting Johansen, 538 P.2d at 748).
113. See Crisci, 426 P.2d at 176.
114. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 24 reporters’ note c (AM. LAW INST.,
Discussion Draft 2015).
115. Section 24, comment c is the only comment that discusses the “disregard the limits”
rule. The comment indicates that an insurer may reject unreasonable settlement demands.
A reasonable settlement demand or offer is one that would be accepted or made by
a reasonable person who bears the sole financial responsibility for the full amount
of the potential judgment. . . . This application of the reasonableness standard to
settlement decisions is sometimes referred to by courts and commentators as the
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respect to limiting the range of available remedies for recoveries when
there is a settlement within the policy limits. As Judge Keeton long ago
observed, “[t]he difficulty is that at the time decisions must be made by
the parties there is uncertainty both as to whether [the insurer] is guilty
of a wrong in failing to settle and also as to whether any harm will result
from such failure.”116
C. Remedies for Breach of the Duty to Settle
1. General
Because the duty to settle involves an implicit promise, the remedy is
not so easy to divine. In this part of the Article, I assume that the base
remedy for breach of the duty to settle, whether based in tort or contract,
is that the insurer will be held liable for breach of either its twin explicit
promises to both indemnify the insured up to the policy limits and to
defend the insured against any covered claim.117 Insurer liability is not a
given under the Reporters’ formulation.118 That is, section 24(1) does not
impose a duty to settle or, in the Reporters’ parlance, the duty to make
reasonable settlement decisions, unless the insured is exposed to claims
beyond the policy limits. Only in such cases does the base remedy under
section 27 include the amount of any judgment in excess of the policy
limits.
Very broadly, “[t]he fundamental question in damages, subject to
many limits and exceptions, is how much a plaintiff lost, comparing what
actually happened to what would have happened but for the wrong.” 119
“disregard the limits” rule, since a reasonable person is defined as one who makes
settlement decisions in disregard of the policy limits.
Id. § 24 cmt. c. Beyond this reference, the Reporters’ Note on comment c only underscores
the importance and usefulness of the standard.
116. Keeton, supra note 1, at 1162.
117. E.g., EDO Corp. v. Newark Ins. Co., 898 F. Supp. 952, 955 (D. Conn. 1995); Nw.
Pump & Equip. Co. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 925 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (in
banc).
118. Section 24(1) provides:
When an insurer has the authority to settle a claim brought against the insured, or
when the authority to settle a claim rests with the insured but the insurer’s prior
consent is required for any settlement to be payable by the insurer, the insurer has
a duty to the insured to make reasonable settlement decisions. The duty is owed
only with respect to claims that expose the insured to liability in excess of the policy
limits.
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 24(1) (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015)
(emphasis added).
119. Douglas Laycock, Restoring Restitution to the Canon, 110 MICH. L. REV. 929, 938
(2012).
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“This means that the plaintiff should be fully indemnified for his loss, but
that he should not recover any windfall.” 120 While this captures the basic
idea, the play in the joints is considerable. That play in the joints is
especially problematic depending on whether the breach of the duty to
settle is a tort or a breach of contract.
First, the principles underlying contract and tort remedies are very
different. Justice Holmes famously observed that it was not immoral to
breach a contract—a breach of contract, in his view, meant that damages
had to be paid to the non-breaching party and nothing else.121 At bottom,
contract remedies are aimed at “compensation” of the plaintiff with
“compensation” defined squarely by the “parties’ own promises and the
risks they undertook.”122 Laying aside for the moment the possibility of
consequential damages, non-pecuniary damages—including punitive
damages—are rare in contract cases as they are rarely contemplated by
the parties’ promises.123
This last observation does not mean that punitive damages are
outside the scope of contracts. Section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts states: “Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good
faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.” 124
The Comment following section 205 provides some enlightenment for
interpretation:
d. Good faith performance. Subterfuges and evasions violate the
obligation of good faith in performance even though the actor
believes his conduct to be justified. . . . A complete catalogue of
types of bad faith is impossible, but the following types are among
those which have been recognized in judicial decisions: evasion of
the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful
rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a power to specify
terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other
party’s performance.
....

120. DOBBS, supra note 48, § 3.1; see generally 3 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF
REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 12.1(1), at 3–14 (2d ed. 1993).
121. The exact quote is: “The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction
that you must pay damages if you do not keep it—and nothing else.” Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897).
122. DOBBS, supra note 120, § 12.1(1), at 6.
123. Id.; see also E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM.
L. REV. 1145, 1146–47 (1970).
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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e. Good faith in enforcement. The obligation of good faith and fair
dealing extends to the assertion, settlement and litigation of
contract claims and defenses. The obligation is violated by
dishonest conduct such as conjuring up a pretended dispute,
asserting an interpretation contrary to one’s own understanding,
or falsification of facts. It also extends to dealing which is candid
but unfair . . . . Other types of violation have been recognized in
judicial decisions: harassing demands for assurances of
performance, rejection of performance for unstated reasons,
willful failure to mitigate damages, and abuse of a power to
determine compliance or to terminate the contract. 125
With the foregoing in mind, contract and tort become inextricably
entwined as “[a]n insurer’s breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing ‘will provide the basis for an action in tort.’” 126
Accordingly, “[b]ecause breach of the implied covenant is actionable as a
tort, the measure of damages for tort actions applies and the insurance

125. Id. § 205 cmts. d, e (citation omitted).
126. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 655 (Cal. 1999) (quoting
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 390 (Cal. 1988) (in bank)); accord Douglas R.
Richmond, Bad Insurance Bad Faith Law, 39 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1, 4 (2003).
Several influential scholars have predicted a decline in tort actions for breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing because they saw the area as having matured and
because of the deterrent effect of punitive damages. See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Natural
History of the Insurer’s Liability for Bad Faith, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1295, 1297–98 (1994);
Robert H. Jerry, II, The Wrong Side of the Mountain: A Comment on Bad Faith’s Unnatural
History, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1343 (1994); Richmond, supra. While bad faith law has
matured, the size and number of bad faith verdicts have increased. Richmond, supra, at 1–
3. Anticipating the State Farm v. Campbell case, which follows in the text below, this
increase has occurred despite the susceptibility of large bad faith awards to reduction or
reversal on appeal. Id. at 2.
Over the years, there has been some curtailing of bad faith actions outside of the
insurance context. For example, in Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669,
679–80 (Cal. 1995), the California Supreme Court overruled an earlier case, Seaman’s
Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984) (in
bank), which held that an action in tort may lie when a defendant seeks to defend himself
from liability by denying, in bad faith, the existence of a contract between the parties.
Seaman’s Direct, 686 P.2d at 1167. The Freeman court held that, in the general commercial
context, a tort action would not lie for bad faith denial of contract. 900 P.2d at 679–80.
However, the court explicitly noted that “nothing in this opinion should be read as affecting
the existing precedent governing enforcement of the implied covenant [of good faith and fair
dealing] in insurance cases.” Id. at 680. This precedent is based on the “special relationship”
between the insured and the insurer, which is based on elements of adhesion, public
interest, and fiduciary responsibility. Id. at 672.
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company generally is liable for ‘any damages which are the proximate
result of that breach.’”127
Tort remedies impose civil liability for harmful wrongdoing in order
to compensate the victim for harm suffered.128 More specifically, tort
remedies are aimed at protecting a person’s interest in her physical,
emotional, and financial security—not only her promises—and thus nonpecuniary damages are more common in tort actions. 129 While both
contract and tort remedies are motivated by a desire to compensate the
non-breaching party or the victim, torts, by contrast, contain an element
of wrongdoing—wrongdoing that deserves punishment.130 Jerome Hall,
the great criminal scholar, centered criminal sanctions around a theory of
responsibility or accountability.131 My point in mentioning this stance is
not to suggest that breach of the duty to settle is criminal in nature, but
rather to emphasize that tort remedies, like criminal sanctions, exist to
hold a bad actor responsible or accountable for his actions.132 Such is not
the case with contract remedies.
As noted above, the availability and scope of a given remedy flows
directly from the substantive right violated.133 The Reporters’ starting
point is that “[a]n insurer that breaches the duty to make reasonable
settlement decisions is subject to liability for the full amount of damages
assessed against the insured in the underlying suit, without regard to the
policy limits.”134 This baseline recognizes the apparent consensus.
The Reporters go further and differentiate torts and contracts by the
differing notions of proximate cause and reasonable foreseeability. 135
These differences are significant. For example, in tort actions, a victim’s
recovery for emotional distress requires that the harm is proximately
127. PPG Indus., Inc., 975 P.2d at 655 (quoting Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 980,
988 (Cal. 1978)).
128. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1 (2d
ed. 2011).
129. Id. § 3; see also DOBBS, supra note 120, § 12.5(1), at 108–10.
130. See Bi-Econ. Mkt, Inc. v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of N.Y., 886 N.E.2d 127, 131 (N.Y.
2008); Ronen Perry, The Role of Retributive Justice in the Common Law of Torts: A
Descriptive Theory, 73 TENN. L. REV. 177, 183–86 (2006). But see Dorit Rubinstein Reiss,
Compensating the Victims of Failure to Vaccinate: What Are the Options?, 23 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 595, 598 (2014) (adopting a compensation model of tort remedy).
131. JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 296 (2d ed. 1947).
132. See DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 128, § 13. Indeed, this was the
suggestion made by the California Supreme Court in Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. of New
Haven. 426 P.2d 173, 177 (Cal. 1967) (in bank) (suggesting elementary justice required an
insurer to be held accountable for its decisions).
133. DOBBS, supra note 48, § 1.6, at 25.
134. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 27(1) (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft
2015).
135. Id. § 27 cmt. b.
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caused by the tortious injury.136 Proximate cause rules aim to impose
liability for the kinds of harms risked by the tortfeasor’s conduct. 137 That
is, the tortfeasor’s liability is circumscribed by the scope of risk his
actions created.138 Thus, if the tortfeasor’s conduct created the risk of
emotional distress, his actions are the proximate cause of the victim’s
emotional distress.139
The scope of the remedy available to the tort victim, then, is
dependent on the tortfeasor’s conduct. Compensatory damages for
emotional distress, though difficult to evaluate, seek “to redress the
concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant’s
wrongful conduct.”140 And while compensatory damages are presumed to
make the tort victim whole, punitive damages are appropriate “if the
defendant’s culpability, after having paid compensatory damages, is so
reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions to achieve
punishment or deterrence.”141 The reprehensibility of the tortfeasor’s
conduct is one factor that guides this inquiry.142
Conversely, a plaintiff who suffers emotional distress as a result of a
breach of contract is limited to damages that “would naturally arise from
the breach or which might have been reasonably contemplated or
foreseen by the parties at the time they contracted, as the probable result
136. DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 128, § 479. Here, I do not recognize the
distinction between intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Both torts
contain a proximate causation element. See John A. Gebauer, Rachel M. Kane & Sonja
Larsen, Distinction Between Negligent and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, in
46 CAL. JURIS. 3D NEGLIGENCE § 85 (1972) (“A cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress exists when there is: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the
defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing,
emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3)
actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous
conduct. On the other hand, a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress
under California law requires that plaintiff show serious emotional distress, actually and
proximately caused by wrongful conduct by a defendant who should have foreseen that the
conduct would cause such distress.” (footnotes omitted)).
137. DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 128, § 198.
138. Id. § 205.
139. California goes further. In Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. of New Haven, the court
stated: “The general rule of damages in tort is that the injured party may recover for all
detriment caused whether it could have been anticipated or not.” 426 P.2d 173, 178 (Cal.
1967) (in bank).
140. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (quoting
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001)); see also DOBBS,
HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 128, § 479 (discussing the extent, limitations, and elements
of compensatory damages).
141. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575
(1996)).
142. Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).
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of the breach.”143 Except where the “contract[] . . . so affect[s] the vital
concerns of the individual that severe mental distress is a foreseeable
result of breach,” courts do not generally consider mental distress a
foreseeable result of breach at the time of contracting. 144 In this way the
potential for emotional distress damages in contract is restricted. While
the tortfeasor is liable for all harms foreseeably risked by his actions, the
breaching party of a contract is liable only for those damages
contemplated or foreseen as probable at the time of contracting.
The Reporters elide these differences with a seemingly innocuous
statement. They state:
Although this Section is agnostic as to the doctrinal label, the
broader approach to whether a loss is foreseeable, which is most
commonly associated with the tort-law label, is the proper
approach. Taking the broader approach to foreseeability promotes
more efficient and fair settlement decisions by placing the insurer
in the position of the insured, responsible for the full potential
loss facing the insured, consistent with the core objective of the
duty: mitigating the conflict between insurer and insured that
would otherwise be present whenever there is a significant risk of
a judgment that is excess of the policy limits. 145
The problem is that this may be too nuanced an approach. In
attempting to include the contract law approach within the duty to settle,
there is room for the uncritical to adhere to the restrictive contract law
view of remedies.
2. The Tort Remedies
When an insurer breaches its duty to settle within the policy limits, it
is likely liable in tort for any excess judgment (that is, in excess of the
policy limits) against the insured.146 Such extra-contractual liability
seems to be “the majority rule in the United States.”147 This approach is
143. Allen v. Jones, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445, 448 (Ct. App. 1980).
144. Id.
145. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 27 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST., Discussion
Draft 2015).
146. Highlands Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 64 F.3d 514, 517 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing
Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 610 P.2d 1038, 1040 (Cal. 1980));
Chandler v. Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 879 N.E.2d 396, 399 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); Doe v. S.C. Med.
Malpractice Liab. Joint Underwriting Ass’n, 557 S.E.2d 670, 674 (S.C. 2001) (citing Trotter
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 377 S.E.2d 343, 349 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988)).
147. Besel v. Viking Ins. Co. of Wis., 49 P.3d 887, 890 (Wash. 2002) (en banc).
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apparently grounded in the idea that the policy limits determine the
extent of an insurer’s liability only when it actually meets its contractual
obligations. In cases of breach of the duty to settle, a different limit
should apply. As one court has explained:
There is an important difference between the liability of an
insurer who performs its obligations and that of an insurer who
breaches its contract. The policy limits restrict only the amount
the insurer may have to pay in the performance of the contract as
compensation to a third person for personal injuries caused by
the insured; they do not restrict the damages recoverable by the
insured for a breach of contract by the insurer.148
Courts and commentators explain that this rule is justified because
the cause of action for bad faith failure to settle sounds in both contract
and tort.149 Moreover, in the iconic Crisci case, the California Supreme
Court held that because bad faith failure to settle is a tort, the insurer
could also be held liable for damages for mental suffering proximately
caused by the insurer’s misconduct. 150 The Crisci court, however, implied
that even if the action sounded in contract, damages for mental suffering
would still be appropriate because “insurers are well aware” that an
insured purchases liability insurance “to protect herself against the risks
of accidental losses, including the mental distress which might follow
from the losses.”151
Of course, construing the breach of the duty to settle either as a
substantive tort or as a tort by reason of breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing raises the specter of punitive damages. The lure of
punitive damages unquestionably provides the impetus to inflate the
breach of an implied contract promise of fair dealing into a full-fledged
“tort” of bad faith. By calculating the deterrent factors of the award as
even a minuscule fraction of the extraordinary “gross (or net) worth” of
insurance companies—even those with cash flow difficulties—a
significant prize is possible.152 In the overall commotion about tort
148. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 201 (Cal. 1958).
149. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 912 F. Supp. 2d 321, 340–41
(D. Md. 2012); Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co. of New Haven, 426 P.2d 173, 178 (Cal. 1967) (in bank);
Mark I. Harrison & Samuel Langerman, Actions Against Insurer for Bad Faith Failure to
Settle Claim, in 21 AM. JURIS. TRIALS § 229 (1974).
150. Crisci, 426 P.2d at 178–79.
151. Id. at 179 (emphasis added). This result harmonizes with the idea that such
damages are appropriate where they would be likely to arise.
152. As justified as an award for punitive damages in failure to settle actions may be,
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell reminds lower courts that
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reform, punitive damage awards against insurers for bad faith have had
the effect of encouraging higher settlements for insureds than would
otherwise be the case.153 In my judgment this is not a bad thing. It is
something individual states may choose to do, and the Restatement
should acknowledge as much.
The Discussion Draft, however, does not address remedies
comprehensively, or discuss the potential for punitive damages assessed
on the insurer.154 Considering the substantial case law awarding punitive
damages in failure-to-settle cases, the Reporters might consider
referencing the potential for punitive damages and relevant
considerations in awarding punitive damages in such cases in section 27.
At minimum, section 27 should include a cross reference to the imminent
section on remedies, if the latter will address awards of punitive damages
against insurers.
3. Contract Remedies
The general rule regarding contract remedies is deceptively simple.
Adopting the classic Hadley v. Baxendale155 case, most jurisdictions
adhere to a version of the following: “Damages recoverable for breach of
contract include both general damages, i.e., those flowing naturally from
the breach, and consequential damages, i.e., those reasonably within the
contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at the time the
contract was made.”156 The questions of availability of general damages,
provision of a defense, and payment within the policy limits for contract
breach of the duty to settle raise little issue.

awards for punitive damages must not be excessive. 538 U.S. 408, 426 (2003). Rather,
courts must consider “(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct, (2)
the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive
damages award, and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury
and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases,” when awarding punitive
damages. Id. at 409 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)).
153. An empirical study of first-party actions that covers more than 2000 claims in
thirty-eight jurisdictions verifies the intuition that the existence of a bad-faith cause of
action has the result of producing higher settlements—even in cases in which the insured is
not represented by an attorney. Mark J. Browne, Ellen S. Pryor & Bob Puelz, The Effect of
Bad-Faith Laws on First-Party Insurance Claims Decisions, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 355, 376–85
(2004). Of course, breach of the duty to settle is at heart a third-party action.
154. As noted below, my hope is that this lack is addressed at some point.
155. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 145; 9 Ex. 341.
156. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985) (citing Pac. Coast Title
Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 325 P.2d 906, 907 (Utah 1958) (citing Hadley,
156 Eng. Rep. 145)).
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The second avenue for recovery is found in the possibility of
consequential damages. Consequential damages very well can exceed
general damages for breach of contract.157 In Bi-Economy Market, Inc. v.
Harleysville Insurance Co. of New York, the Court of Appeals of New
York employed contract damages principles to find an insurer liable for
consequential damages resulting from an insurer’s failure to fulfill its
contractual obligations in good faith.158 The Bi-Economy court explained
that consequential damages, those not flowing directly from the breach,
are appropriate when the “unusual or extraordinary damages [are] . . .
within the contemplation of the parties as the probable result of a breach
at the time of or prior to contracting.” 159 Whether the parties reasonably
contemplated consequential damages depends on “the nature, purpose
and particular circumstances of the contract known by the parties” and
“what liability the [insurer] fairly may be supposed to have assumed
consciously, or to have warranted the [insured] reasonably to suppose
that it assumed, when the contract was made.” 160
Even if an excess judgment could be considered as not directly
flowing from an insurer’s breach of the duty to settle, then undoubtedly,
such a consequence fits the Bi-Economy’s requirement of precontemplation by the parties. An excess judgment resulting from the
insurer’s failure to settle a claim within the policy limits certainly seems
within the purview of at least the insurer at the time the contract is
formed.
Finally, contract remedies are generally more limited than tort
remedies. Specifically and germane to breach of the duty to settle,
[t]he traditional rule, adopted by the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts and followed in a majority of states, does not allow
punitive damages in the absence of an independent tort, even if
the breach is opportunistic [(the breaching party attempts to get

157. Id. at 801–02 (citing Pac. Coast Title Ins. Co., 325 P.2d at 908).
158. 886 N.E.2d 127, 129–32 (N.Y. 2008).
159. Id. at 130 (quoting Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 537 N.E.2d 176, 178 (N.Y. 1989));
see also Panasia Estates, Inc. v. Hudson Ins. Co., 886 N.E.2d 135, 137 (N.Y. 2008) (decided
the same day as Bi-Economy, and holding that “consequential damages resulting from a
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be asserted in an insurance
contract context” (quoting Bi-Econ., 886 N.E.2d at 130)). This is the classic Hadley v.
Baxendale formulation of consequential damages. 156 Eng. Rep. 145.
160. Bi-Econ., 886 N.E.2d at 130 (quoting Kenford, 537 N.E.2d at 179).
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more than she bargained for at the expense of the nonbreaching
party)].161
As noted above, the exceptions to this rule apply when the breach is
also a tort, a breach of fiduciary duty, or a bad faith breach of an
insurance contract.162
4. The Reporters’ Formulation
As noted above, section 24 requires that insurers make reasonable
settlement decisions when handling their insured’s claims. 163 The section
aims to address the apparent conflict of interest between an insured’s
aversion to trial and a potential excess judgment and an insurer’s
proclivity to proceed to trial. This aligns with the California formulation
of the duty. Section 24, however, does little to encourage an insurer to
meaningfully consider the insured’s interest because under section 24(3),
an insurer’s duty to accept reasonable settlement demands never
obligates an insurer to pay any amount exceeding the policy limits. 164

161. William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629,
653–54 (1999).
162. Id. at 636–37. Professor Dodge avers that punitive damages should be awardable in
any willful breach of contract action for both the sake of deterring breaches of contract and
efficiency. Id. at 637. Cases awarding punitive damages for an insurer’s breach of its duty to
settle reflect the above exceptions. Cain v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
held that punitive damages are appropriate “in an action arising out of a breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing which is implied in every liability insurance policy.”
121 Cal. Rptr. 200, 206 (Ct. App. 1975) (citing Fletcher v. W. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78 (Ct. App. 1970)). The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that in failure to settle
cases, “[t]he availability of a punitive damages award is not automatic, but rather is
governed by the standard applicable in other tort cases. The plaintiff must show that the
defendant acted with oppression, malice, fraud or gross negligence or wantonness.” Newport
v. USAA, 11 P.3d 190, 204 (Okla. 2000) (alteration in original) (quoting Buzzard v. Farmers
Ins. Co., 824 P.2d 1105, 1115 (Okla. 1991)). The Appellate Court of Illinois explained that
punitive damages are appropriate for an insurer’s failure to settle because the insurer owes
a fiduciary obligation to the insured in the settlement of its claims. O’Neill v. Gallant Ins.
Co., 769 N.E.2d 100, 109–11 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
163. Specifically, section 24(3) provides: “An insurer’s duty to make reasonable
settlement decisions includes a duty to accept reasonable settlement demands made by
claimants, subject to the following limitation: the amount, if any, that an insurer is
obligated by this duty to contribute to a settlement is never greater than its policy limits.”
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 24(3) (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015).
164. Id. Beyond this limitation, however, section 24 and its corresponding Comment
scarcely address the insured’s available remedies. Comments a, e, and h cursorily mention
that an insurer’s breach of its duty to make reasonable settlement decisions renders it liable
for excess judgments entered on its insureds. Id. § 24 cmts. a, e, h.
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Section 24(3) seems to suggest that the liability of the insurer is
limited. Section 27 addresses this shortcoming in part. 165 Section 27
describes consequences an insurer faces if it fails to make reasonable
settlement decisions. Section 27(1) provides that an insurer is liable for
any excess judgment entered against the insured due to the insurer’s
failure to make reasonable settlement decisions.166 Moreover, section
27(2) gives the insured the right to recover all reasonably foreseeable
(consequential) damages “[i]f, and only if, [the] insured is entitled to
recover from an insurer under [section 27(1)].”167
Read together, sections 24 and 27 fall short. First, consequential
damages are excluded if there is no excess judgment. Section 27’s
Comment reiterates the limitation by stating that “[n]o damages are
available under this Section if the insurer’s breach of the duty to make
reasonable settlement decisions does not produce an excess judgment in
the underlying lawsuit.”168
As a result, under section 27, consequential damages are unavailable
when the insurer’s behavior is somewhere past “unreasonable” but not
quite reaching “bad faith.” Section 24’s Comment points out that the
“reasonableness” standard section 24 establishes is analogous to the
negligence standard in tort law. Section 24 and commentators alike
agree, however, that there is little functional difference between courts
that use a “negligence” standard and courts that use a “bad-faith”
standard to determine whether an insurer had breached its duty to
settle. So on the one hand, section 24 collapses the standards in favor of a
“reasonableness” inquiry, and on the other, section 27 limits an insured’s
recovery in absence of an excess judgment to when an insurer’s

165. It would be useful to include within section 24 either a cross-reference to section 27
or a caveat that it is subject to other provisions.
166. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 27(1) (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft
2015). Section 27(1) provides: “An insurer that breaches the duty to make reasonable
settlement decisions is subject to liability for the full amount of damages assessed against
the insured in the underlying suit, without regard to the policy limits.” Id. While it does not
say as much, implicit in section 27 is liability for the policy limits as well.
167. Id. § 27(2). The full text of section 27(2) reads: “If, and only if, an insured is entitled
to recover from an insurer under subsection (1) for an amount in excess of the policy limits,
the insured is also entitled to recover for other foreseeable loss.” Id.
168. Id. § 27 cmt. b. (emphasis added). Comment b goes on to explain that this limitation
is one of practicality and that any aggravation, inconvenience, or expenses incurred by the
insurer’s unreasonable settlement behavior are likely to be minor. Id. Comment b further
posits that allowing such damages in absence of an excess judgment would result in
uncertainty for insurers and higher premiums for policyholders. See id. The comment
concedes, however, that insureds should still be able to recover if an insurer’s behavior
amounts to bad faith or if such recovery is authorized by statute. Id.
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settlement behavior amounted to bad faith. This has the effect of roiling
already muddy waters.
The common law contains numerous examples of courts’ willingness
to award consequential damages resulting from an insurer’s failure to
settle without an excess judgment.169 While the entry of an excess
judgment will almost always be “[t]he most telling evidence of foreseeable
damage,” the insured need only “show that he has suffered actual injury
proximately caused by the insurer’s failure to settle the suit within a
reasonable time after settlement was possible.” 170 As one court has
explained, while an excess judgment supports the inference that an
insurer has breached its duty to settle, it is not required.171 Rather, an
insured can recover damages “to compensate for all detriment
proximately resulting [from an insurer’s unreasonable settlement
behavior], including the economic loss as well as emotional distress
resulting from the conduct or from the economic losses caused by the
conduct.”172
Going further, it is not difficult to imagine that an insurer’s
unreasonable behavior surrounding claim settlement can cause an
insured emotional distress before the final disposition of the claim.173
169. Delancy v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 947 F.2d 1536, 1552 (11th Cir. 1991)
(explaining that Georgia law does not require an excess judgment to allow bad faith
recovery for breach of the duty to settle); Landow v. Med. Ins. Exch. of Cal., 892 F. Supp.
239, 241 (D. Nev. 1995) (finding that excess judgment is not required for breach of the duty
to settle); Howard v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 42, 48 (Ct. App. 2010) (“An
insurer’s wrongful failure to settle may be actionable even without rendition of an excess
judgment.”); Perera v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 35 So. 3d 893, 902 (Fla. 2010) (holding, on
certification from the Eleventh Circuit, that Florida law does not require an excess
judgment to find that an insurer breached its duty to settle).
170. Delancy, 947 F.2d at 1552. The California Court of Appeal has explained that
“where the insurer’s misconduct goes beyond a simple failure to settle within policy limits or
the insured suffers consequential damages apart from an excess judgment” an insured may
recover for an insurer’s failure to settle even in the absence of an excess judgment. Howard,
115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 68; see also Bodenhamer v. Superior Court, 238 Cal. Rptr. 177, 181 (Ct.
App. 1987) (suggesting that an insurer’s unreasonable delay in effecting settlement of its
insured’s claims may permit recovery of consequential damages resulting from the delay).
171. Landow, 892 F. Supp. at 241 (quoting Camelot by the Bay Condo. Owners’ Ass’n v.
Scottsdale Ins. Co., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 354, 362 (Ct. App. 1994)).
172. Id. (quoting Fletcher v. W. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 94 (Ct. App. 1970)).
173. Larraburu Bros. v. Royal Indem. Co., 604 F.2d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 1979)
(“[U]nreasonable conduct can be a proximate cause of injury before the final disposition as
well as after. An unreasonable refusal to accept a settlement offer causes the insurer to be
liable for consequential damages, such as mental suffering or economic loss . . . .”). Crisci v.
Security Insurance Co. of New Haven points out that in addition to indemnity, insureds
purchasing liability insurance consider, “as insurers are well aware, . . . the peace of mind
and security [the insurance] will provide in the event of an accidental loss, and recovery of
damages for mental suffering has been permitted for breach of contracts which directly
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There is no reason to treat breach of the duty to settle any differently
than breach of any other contract.
These cases stand in opposition to section 27’s contention that
consequential damages resulting from an insurer’s unreasonable
settlement behavior are necessarily minor. 174 It is not unforeseeable that
an insured would face catastrophic consequences as a result of an
insurer’s breach of its duty to settle—in such cases “damages for losses
well in excess of the policy limits, such as for a home or a business, may
therefore be foreseeable and provable.”175 As noted above, peace of mind
for the insured is very much a part of the insurance bargain. 176 It is not
for nothing that insurers spend considerable sums to tell us that we are
in good hands or that, like a good neighbor, they are there. To sum up,
section 27’s limitation on consequential damages and non-pecuniary
harm unjustifiably limits an insured’s remedies where courts have
recognized legitimate bases for recovery. The Reporters’ response is that
this limitation is grounded in practicality where such costs or harm are
likely minor.177 This position is taken without citing any authority.
Again, this departure from even restrictive contract remedies seems
unjustified.
Finally, neither section 24 nor section 27 mentions the potential for
an award of punitive damages to insureds for an insurer’s failure to
settle. The implication that punitive damages are not available in this
context is another departure from the norm in the United States. 178
concern the comfort, happiness or personal esteem of one of the parties.” 426 P.2d 173, 179
(Cal. 1967) (in bank) (citing Chelini v. Nieri, 196 P.2d 915 (Cal. 1948) (in bank)).
174. In Delancy, the insured’s health so deteriorated as a result of the insurer’s
settlement behavior, he ultimately suffered a stroke and died. 947 F.2d at 1543. The
insured in Howard suffered substantial financial hardship due to his insurer’s settlement
behavior. 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 68. The insureds in Bodenhamer suffered pecuniary losses
and damage to their jewelry store’s reputation. 238 Cal. Rptr. at 181. Objectively, these
consequences are not minor.
175. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 802 (Utah 1985) (“[B]ecause bankruptcy
was a foreseeable consequence of fire insurer’s failure to pay, insurer was liable for
consequential damages flowing from bankruptcy.” (citing Reichert v. Gen. Ins. Co. of Am.,
428 P.2d 860, 864 (Cal. 1967) (in bank), vacated on other grounds, 442 P.2d 377 (Cal. 1968)
(in bank))).
176. Id.
177. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIAB. INS. § 27 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST., Discussion
Draft 2015).
178. E.g., Bi-Econ. Mkt., Inc. v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of N.Y., 886 N.E.2d 127, 131 (N.Y.
2008). Punitive damages “‘are not measured by the pecuniary loss or injury of the plaintiff
as compensation’ but are ‘assessed by way of punishment to the wrongdoer and example to
others.’” Id. Further, in assessing punitive damages, “[t]here is no rigid formula by which
the amount of punitive damages is fixed, although they should bear some reasonable
relation to the harm done and the flagrancy of the conduct causing it.” Id. (alteration in
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Removing the possibility for punitive damages and consequential
damages for an insurer’s breach of the contractual duty to settle severely
undermines the insured’s interest and exacerbates existing perverse
incentives of the insurer. This approach cannot be as effective as
threatening the breaching party with bad faith and punitive damages
and forcing a negotiation with the other party for a release of the
contract.179 As Professor William Dodge has argued, because of high costs
associated with litigation and errors of judgment resulting from contract
breaches, protecting contractual obligations with expectation damages is
less efficient than protecting them with punitive damages because the
threat of punitive damages for willful breach will push the party who
wants to avoid the contract to negotiate a release of her obligations, a less
expensive alternative to litigation. 180 The Reporters’ approach to damages
implies that they see the duty as sounding only in contract. With the
foregoing in mind, the consequent limitation on damages is problematic.
The appropriate remedy for breach of the duty to settle is important.
In this respect, the duty to settle as described in sections 24 and 27
remains incomplete. The Discussion Draft does not yet address remedies
comprehensively nor does it discuss the potential for punitive damages
assessed on the insurer. My hope is that the final product will ultimately
align with the dominant approach first advanced by Judge Keeton,
adopted by California, and accepted by many other states.
CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court long ago articulated the values that
underlie a robust enforcement mechanism regarding an insurer’s duty to
settle. In language that seems uncannily oriented to a Restatement of the
Law of Liability Insurance, they eloquently stated:
Fundamental in our jurisprudence is the principle that for every
wrong there is a remedy and that an injured party should be
compensated for all damage proximately caused by the
wrongdoer. Although we recognize exceptions from these
fundamental principles, no departure should be sanctioned unless
there is a strong necessity therefor.181

original) (quoting I. H. P. Corp. v. 210 Cent. Park S. Corp., 228 N.Y.S.2d 883, 889 (App. Div.
1962)).
179. Dodge, supra note 161, at 663–64.
180. Id. at 675.
181. Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co. of New Haven, 426 P.2d 173, 178 (Cal. 1967) (in bank).

192

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:155

The Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance should not be a
departure from existing norms where such is not needed. Indeed any
such departure signals a long and costly spate of litigation. Judge Keeton
and later, Kent Syverud, were the architects of a duty to settle regime
that has actually worked. The Restatement of the Law of Liability
Insurance should in fact be a restatement of the law—particularly in
areas of the law that are well settled and not obviously wrong.
Ultimately, an insurer that breaches its duty to settle should not be
spared the consequences of its actions.

